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Response
James W. Laine
I want to begin my response by stating that I am very sympathetic
with what I believe Professor Daniel is trying to do in his paper. That
is, I am sympathetic with his program of differentiating:
(a) ritual practice which involves “skilled players,” practiced in their
gestures and comfortable in their roles, from
(b) ritual practices presented to us as signs of articulate ideologies.
I cannot support, however, his assignation of (b) to the category of
“religion,” a category he sees as Christian, or at least Christian-
inspired, while (a), the subject matter of much of my courses in the
Religious Studies Department here at Macalester, is assigned to some
other category (or department). To do so would, among other things,
put me out of a job. To situate myself as a subject, as any good post-
modernist should do, it is important to confess my allegiances at the
outset.
The problem of using the word “religion” as a universal, i.e., as a
term referring to an essential part of all human cultures, is a problem
with a certain history. In 1962, W. C. Smith, in The Meaning and End of
Religion, traced the evolution of the term religion and noted the subtle
ways in which the term took on very new meanings over its career,
two millennia long. He also stressed the problematic ways in which
the word is applied to religious phenomena in non-Western cultures.
In regard to South Asia, the Sanskritist Paul Hacker (who influ-
enced the later work of Wilhelm Halbfass) wrote several articles trac-
ing the way the classical Sanskrit term dharma, meaning order or law,
came to be taken in the twentieth century as a direct translation of the
English word “religion,” so that modern Indians can ask one another,
“what is your dharm?” and get answers like Hinduism, Islam, Chris-
tianity, Sikhism—answers unthinkable in ancient times.
This very modern idea of “having a religion,” of belonging to an
institutional body called “Christianity” or “Buddhism” in the way one
belongs to a club is, in South Asia, traceable largely to the influence of
Western colonials. It is not quite the same thing as communalism,
which in some ways pre-dates colonialism. I have, in my own research,
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found pre-colonial seventeenth-century use of terms like “the dharma
of Muslims” to mean the Islamic religion, and even one occurrence, in
a Persian text authored by a Hindu, of “the din of Hindus,” meaning
the religion of the Hindus.1 Moreover, in this period, we read of Hin-
dus converting to Islam (and re-converting to Hinduism), which
implies the self-conscious decision to join the other community.
But it is important to note that that kind of religion—self-conscious,
creedal, institutional — is not a term co-extensive with Christianity.
There are many Christians who would have had the same sort of
unselfconscious relationship to their traditions that the folk at the
South Indian wedding that Daniel attended have to theirs. Mary Dou-
glas wrote an evocative essay entitled “The Bog Irish” in which she
describes the difference in Irish housewives living in England, buying
fish every Friday in order to submit to the Catholic rule of Friday absti-
nence from eating meat, and their bishops, who, in the 1960s, did away
with the rule and encouraged the moral alternative of putting a little
extra in the poor box.2 What the bishops saw as an empty ritual was a
ritual empty of ideological content. It no longer articulated a particular
doctrine about Christ’s suffering and death on Good Friday. What
Douglas shows is that, although such rituals are empty of their origi-
nally intended theology, they continue to confer meaning. For the Irish
immigrant to England, Friday abstinence was first and foremost a way
of maintaining Catholic identity. It proclaimed: “We are not English;
we are not Protestant.”
Now, had their practice of abstinence slipped out of the category
“religion” and into the category of “ethnic identity?” Perhaps, if we
take the theorist’s circumscribed view of religion, but these Irish
women would probably not have seen it that way.
In the West, the use of the term religion to refer to a system of beliefs
only dates from the late seventeenth century, and even then it is used
more by, and for, Protestant groups than by Catholics, who clung to
the idea of their “one, true faith.” Muslims, too, did not think of them-
selves as followers of a religion called Islam until the late nineteenth
century, but rather referred to themselves as “believers.” Today, mod-
ern secularists are critical of dogmatic Christianity and its corrupt,
bureaucratic organizations, and they contrast it, as a “religion,” with
“the whole way of life,” which is Hinduism or Islam. Or they distin-
guish religion (narrow, dogmatic, institutionalized) from what they
would call a philosophy (maybe a romanticized Daoism, Buddhism, or
Deep Ecology). One often tries to avoid sullying the reputation of Bud-
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dhism by calling it a “philosophy” rather than that nasty thing, reli-
gion. I wonder if Daniel is doing something similar, though turning in
another direction: you post-Enlightenment Christians and Christian-
influenced neo-Hindus have religions (creedal, doctrinaire, institu-
tional); in the good old days of traditional Asia, we had “culture”!
My point here is one I believe consonant with Talal Asad’s argu-
ment that the scope and meaning of religion shifts according to the cul-
ture and cultural location of the user.3 Thus, I might argue that
“religion is a political institution set up to enforce a common world-
view and morality among a society’s members” while Schleiermacher
tells us “cultured despisers” to turn from “all that is usually called reli-
gion” and “aim your attention only at these individual intimations and
moods that you will find in all expressions and noble deeds of God-
inspired persons.”4 His critic Karl Barth wants to distinguish true
evangelical Christianity from the category of religion because the latter
he sees as the hopeless, misguided attempt of human beings to con-
struct a system which will assure them of their beatitude — in other
words, religion is always a mistake, inspired by false doctrines of sal-
vation by works. Reliance on God’s grace has to be something other
than religion.5
So, religion as a general category, or reificationist terms like “Chris-
tianity,” “Buddhism,” or “Islam,” will have a wide variety of mean-
ings. In the interest of clarity, we can as theorists mount a kind of
linguistic reform movement and call for their abandonment. But I
think linguistic reforms are rarely efficacious. Religion will remain a
“fuzzy” (as in “fuzzy logic”) and contested word and, if excised from
our vocabularies, new fuzzy words will take its place.
W. C. Smith asks: does the word “religion” refer to personal piety
(leaving aside the peculiar slipperiness of the word “piety”)?6 To an
ideal system? To an empirical system? To the sum of the above? The
first distinguishes religion from indifference or rebellion; the second
and third distinguish one religion from another; and the fourth demar-
cates religion from other spheres of social life, for example, art or eco-
nomics. How I choose to employ this slippery term depends on the
particular argument I am trying to make. Am I suspicious of institu-
tions? Am I worried about my neighbors’ immorality? Do I want more
or less religion in the public square? Depending on my agenda, I will
contract or expand my definition of religion and what I deem real reli-
gion to be.
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I would like to look at two examples of the process of reification, the
process whereby a religiousness coterminous with general social life
becomes “a religion,” a named entity referring to a doctrinal or institu-
tional system.
*****
The word “dharma” goes through at least four stages in the transforma-
tion from its classical meaning to its present use as a translation for the
English word “religion.” In Classical Sanskrit, it means law or duty,
and serves to blur the distinction between a natural law (like the law of
gravity) and that of social construction (like wives obeying their hus-
bands). In this function, dharma affirms the brahmins’ view of the way
things should naturally be.
The first challenge to this usage came in the form of heterodox
movements: Jain and Buddhist. Both used the word dharma or its ver-
nacular equivalent to mean “the teaching,” and, by extension, the truth
their founder had discovered. In response to these challenges, conserv-
ative Hindu apologists constructed dharma texts, like The Laws of Manu,
during the first centuries of the Common Era.
According to Sheldon Pollock, in response to Turkish invasions,
brahmin advisors in royal courts across northern India codified a
whole way of life that they felt was threatened by the intrusion of an
alien Islamic civilization.7 Their work, contained in encyclopedic texts
called dharma nibandhas, may have used the word dharma to mean “a
whole way of life,” but this way of life was now thoroughly articulated
and ideological—hardly a kind of unselfconscious set of assumptions.
Only in the final stage, the period of encounter with the West, is the
word dharma colored by the influence of Western (and especially
Protestant Christian) notions about “religion.” This is the period in
which Daniel is interested, and he is correct in seeing it as a period in
which people in South Asia become self-conscious users of the word
“religion” and the word(s) they chose for its translation, thus produc-
ing through this new discourse new social formations, indeed, “reli-
gions” themselves. Paul Hacker made a similar observation when he
contrasted such social formations as Neo-Hinduism and differentiated
them from what he called Classical Hinduism.8
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*****
There is a big difference between the localized, unselfconscious wor-
ship of deities (kami) in Japan, and the adoption of a Chinese name for
these traditions (shen tao>Shinto) and its systematic theology. The Nara
Period (eighth century) texts, Kojiki and Nihonshoki, took popular
deities and used them in Chinese-influenced, official, and nationalist
mythologies, thus beginning the history of state-sponsored religion in
Japan, a process which, with various ebbs and flows, continued up
until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The ideologization of
Shinto as a national cult under Motoori Norinaga (died, 1801) was a
precursor to the sort of twentieth century attempts made to distinguish
Shinto from “religion” because, in ways opposite to Daniel’s sugges-
tion, “religion” for these thinkers does not refer to their carefully
crafted national ideology of Japanese identity. The well-known differ-
entiation between Shrine Shinto, promoted by the state as a non-reli-
gious mark of Japanese identity and patriotism, and Sect Shinto,
specific sectarian groups called kyokai (church), may have been Japan-
ese responses to European styles of reflection on religion, but the ten-
dency to organize religion from the national capital had cultural
antecedents going back to Prince Shotoku and the first Japanese con-
tacts with China.
But in the sense Daniel has proposed, Shinto becomes a religion, just
as, I would argue, Hinduism does, not simply as a reaction to Christian
influence, but already in reaction to earlier experiences of pluralism.
Hinduism begins to be a creed in opposition to Buddhism, leading to
the writing of encyclopedic compendia of orthodox law, a process
intensified in the encounter with the Islamic world. In Japan, the “reli-
gion” of Shinto is born out of Chinese contact in the sixth to eighth cen-
turies, and reborn in the encounter with the West. Also, in Japan, there
continues to be some fluidity in the use of terms to describe religion or
religions; for example Buddhism, Shugendo, and Shinto are “ways”
(dao, do, to), whereas New Religions are “sects” (shu-kyo), the latter con-
noting a greater degree of exclusivity and reification.
*****
I want to conclude, then, that the impulse to systematize, abstract,
reify, and institutionalize, is not unique to Christianity, and is not the
essential element in “religion.” This impulse seems to occur in places
Macalester International Vol. 8
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of cross-cultural encounter, where there is a confusion of norms. This
self-consciousness was described well by Herbert Fingarette in his
rather Wittgensteinian perspective on Confucian etiquette. If a person
from a handshaking culture greets a person from a bowing culture
then the ingrained choreography of greeting is lost and they become
clumsy, unsettled, and self-conscious.9 Similarly, people at a Hindu
wedding in New Jersey are not skilled performers in a well-choreo-
graphed rite. They are self-conscious, awkward, and feel compelled to
explain meanings. Presumably, British missionaries felt the same way.
But is this Christian? I think the same two patterns can be found there,
as well. In discussing Christian notions of ritual, Talal Asad asks:
“How did the idea of teaching the body to develop ‘virtues’ through
material means come to be displaced by the idea of separating internal
feelings and thoughts called ‘emotions’ from social forms/formulas/
formalities?”10 How did Christian rituals move from a kind of dance,
learned and cultivated to produce virtues and dispositions, to sym-
bolic codes expressing doctrinal meanings learned elsewhere? Asad’s
analysis, in short, suggests that Christian rites have not always been
burdened by what Daniel calls the “surfeit of mind.”
Daniel says a non-believing Christian would be a strange creature,
indeed. But would she? For Mary Douglas’s Bog Irish, I doubt belief is
a major concern. For them, the strange creature would be a Protestant
Irishman, who had adopted a set of beliefs. The word “Christian,” in a
thoroughly Christian culture, can come to be nothing more than a syn-
onym for “human being,” as one discovers in the etymology of cretin
from the French word chrétien. Christian can mean “civilized person,”
as the Southern racist uses it in the phrase “a Christian and a white
man.” For most of the British serving in India, heartfelt proclamations
of their beliefs was not what they had in mind when they upheld the
virtues of Christian civilization. To be a Christian, then, can mean
many things, for example:
1. to be a civilized person (in Europe)
2. to be a member of a Christian caste (in India)
3. to be a member of a church
4. to have a personal relationship to Jesus Christ.
In modern America, when I hear a professional football player say “I
am a Christian,” I know that he means (4) a deep personal relationship
to Jesus, which I might find disconcerting even though I might be (3) a
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church member. Good Catholics wince when confronted on street cor-
ners with the question, “Are you a Christian?” (Not that kind!) We dis-
tinguish these meanings of religion or Christianity by context because
they are family-resemblance terms, and their fuzziness is inherent to
their usefulness. The context will determine the scope one applies to
such a term as religion . . . and we will all continue to argue about the
proper width of that scope.
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